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ORTllE

JOYS OF
WRITING ATREATISE
Joel Seligman
From time to time during the five years I have worked with Louis Loss on what will
be a 12-volume work on Securities Regulation, I have been asked what treatise writing
is like. Normally the question is posed with the unspoken assumption that it must be a
little like a serious case of leprosy or perhaps a violation of the 13th Amendment. For
example: "Is it horribly depressing?" Or: "How many years do you think it will take?"
Then there is a somewhat more cynical unspoken assumption that occasionally can be
perceived: "Don't you miss theoretical writing?" Or most splendid of all: "Don't you
look forward to writing law review articles again?"
There is, of course, some truth in each of these assumptions. It is hard to imagine
working on any long project without an occasionally depressing day. This one will
take close to 10 years to write and be approximately 6,000 pages in length. There is
no doubt that proportionately there is less pure theoretical writing in a treatise than
in a law review article.
But that said, the simple truth is that I am happier working on the treatise than I
have ever been workiJlg on anything else. There is a joy in knowing that I never have to
struggle to figure out what I will write tomorrow, or for that matter, three years from
tomorrow. The very structure of a treatise gives one a comfort that no one facing blank
pages at the beginning of a purely theoretical work consistently can enjoy. To be sure,
there is a breathtaking pleasure in writing a piece as original as the music of Mozart.
But very few of us, in fact, are Mozart. In music, for example, there was only one.
Writing theoretical pieces like Salieri, I suspect, could also be tedious after a time.
More importantly, I like treatise writing because I believe in the form. During the
New Deal period, it was common for legal authors like Jerome Frank to characterize
themselves as "fact skeptics." They believed, to invoke a favorite quotation from
Holmes, that "the life of the law was not logic, but experience." The thrust of the
fashionable intellectual movement of that day was both empirical and anti theoretical.
Times obviously have changed. We live at the "high noonl' of a new generation of theoretical legal scholarship. It would not be correct to state that it is anti-empirical, but I
view the volumes I am co-writing with Louis Loss as contributing to the context of this
generation's work.
The theoretical work in corporate or securities law today typically focuses on a discrete problem and applies some variant of economic analysis to it. The strength of this
type of work often is in its economic analysis rather than in discussion of the context of
the problem. Our work, in contrast, focuses on the context.
By context, I mean several things. First, I mean textual context, that is, a full development of the structure of the statutes, rules, and agency interpretations in the field.
The nature of a securities law problem seems quite different when you can contrast it
with the legal treatment of several analogous problems. It is difficult for me to imagine
criticizing, say, the disclosure obligations under the 1968 tender offer amendments to
the Securities Exchange Act, without understanding analogous securities law disclosure regimens. Much of the best writing concerning a mandatory disclosure system
has focused on other disclosure obligations. Several of the provisions in the 1968 Act
were directly inspired by these earlier laws. In attempting to interpret the 1968 Act,
the SEC invariably will draw on its experience interpreting the earlier laws.
Context also refers to the historical context of a problem. In 1982, for a simple
example, the SEC adopted its integrated disclosure system, partially consolidating the
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new issue disclosure techniques of the 1933 Securities Act and the periodic disclosure
obligations of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. To understand the 1982 administrative
action requires an understanding of the events that led to the adoption of the securities
laws in the 1930s, the laws themselves, the agency's subsequent rulemaking and interpretations, and the commentators' acceptance or criticism of these rules.
Indeed, to fully understand the integrated disclosure system requires a third type of
contextual analysis, one that I term empirical context. The ultimate test of the wisdom
of a law is in its application in the real world. To understand this application, one must
understand the real world itself. With the disclosure provisions of the securities laws,
this requires some understanding of securities underwriting and accounting. Increasingly, it also requires some understanding of alternative securities law systems such as
those in London and in the European Community. Soon, I suspect, the real requisite of
a securities law scholar will not be a rudimentary knowledge of the economics of information, but conversational Japanese. And, in securities law, there is also a need to have
some sense of the potentialities of computer and communications technologies. The
true "formative" events that led to the 1982 integrated disclosure system were probably
the increased celerity with which debt securities could be distributed in the Eurodebt
market because of computer technology and the fax machine. This is not the kind of
point, say, that Samuelson or Posner typically emphasize in their work. In a more
complicated problem, for example, the mechanisms of the 1987 stock market crash,
computer technology revolutionized the very types of securities traded, making possible such derivative instruments as index futures and index options whose prices change
in response to the price movements of hundreds of underlying stocks. Computer technology was also responsible for creating trading strategies such as portfolio insurance,
and ultimately for breeding an exaggerated confidence in the liquidity of the markets
and the capacity of intermarket trading systems to handle significantly increased
volume.
The danger as one multiplies the dimensions of "context" is Clilettantism. No scholar
who writes generally about a field will ever know about a specific problem as well as a
specialist who focuses just on that problem. This has been brought home to me in several ways. I often feel subject to a peculiar linguistic handicap, when I visit the floor
of an exchange, by my almost total inability to understand what the floor personnel
are saying to each other. I must concede this may be my own fault. I find it difficult to
understand sentences without verbs. This, however, is just one corner of the empirical
context of securities regulation. There are several others, such as those that focus on
limited partnerships, exempt Federal Government or municipal securities, nonexempt
debt securities; broker-dealer regulation, securities litigation, or corporate compliance
with reporting, tender offer, and insider trading requirements. No generalist can hope
to fully understand all or even a significant part of these empirical contexts. Thus the
tension in this type of work is using one's best judgment to determine how much one
must know to effectively write a contextual work about securities law while operating
under the constraints of "world enough and time."
Let me offer an example. At page 1073 of the treatise, Louis Loss and I began
quotation of a detailed definition of the term "commodity" in the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Act of 1974 by observing that it included "a couple of dozen
edible items .. . (except onions for some reason) . .. "Little did we know that our parenthetical reference to onions would generate more correspondence than any other part
of the treatise, ultimately involving a distinguished economist from the University of
Chicago, an SEC Commissioner, and a former president of the United States.
From my point-of-view, this was at most a marginally relevant clause, justified, in
part, by a footnote from a Seventh Circuit decision, suggesting "a physiological basis
for the onion producers' crying."
Our readers saw it differently. In draft form, part of this volume was circulated
to University of Chicago Business School professor Merton Miller who graciously
acknowledged that "it was certainly written by someone who knows his onions
(though not, apparently, why futures contracts for onions were banned)." He " hinted"
that the charge was led by an influential congressman who later ended up in the
White House.

The danger as one multiplies
the dimensions of "context"
is dilettantism.
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Soon a detailed letter arrived from SEC Commissioner Joseph Grundfest (now teaching at Stanford Law School). Grundfest, tongue barely in cheek, in part wrote:
As any sous chef at Burger King would have been able to tell you, had you
simply asked, futures trading on onions was prohibited by the 1974 amendments
to the Commodities Exchange Act because of the perceived adverse effect of
futures trading on cash market onions prices. . . .
Needless to say, anyone with the slightest market savvy understands that onion
prices are not determined like potato, silver, or stock index prices, which are
invariably stable and well behaved. Onions are a product unto themselves, and
have "long been the subject of extreme price fluctuations even before the advent
of futures trading." ... Indeed, even with a strict prohibition on onion futures
trading we have not been able to stamp out fraud in that frenzied and cut-throat
corner of America's economy.
He later softened his tone somewhat, concluding:
You should not, however, feel slighted by your inability to discover the roots
of the onion exemption. The compilers of the Lexis database apparently found
the exception so incredible that in their report of Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 E2d
1137 n.9 (7th Cir. 1982) the database explains that "unions [sic] were excepted
from the amended definition .... "That is, I am sure, a great comfort to Lane
Kirkland and others.
There are practical limits to a treatise writer's pride, particularly when wounded by
someone who had earlier made known his intention to repeat the treatise writer's own
mistakes by becoming an academic. I penned Joe a brief note thanking him for his
breathtakingly incomplete analysis, snidely informing him that he had completely overlooked the political dimension of the exemption. There I assumed matters would rest.
I had not, however, a4:curately gauged Joe's erudition or political connections. A few
days later a copy of a considerably longer letter to former President Ford arrived.
This one stated in part:

There are practical limits to a
treatise writer's pride, particularly when wounded by
someone who had earlier
made known his intention
to repeat the treatise writer's
own mistakes by becoming
an academic.

It was also quite a thrill to learn that you are a leading authority on the regulation of trading in onion futures, an area of expertise that is sorely lacking in
today's Washington . Despite your familiarity with the politics of onion futures,
you might not be fully aware of the wonderful legal draftsmanship that gives
rise to the famous "onion exemption" and the scholarship that the exemption has
spawned. Rather than simply prohibit the trading of futures on onions, a solution
far too obvious for Congress to comprehend, Congress determined to draft a very
broad definition of the term "commodity," but then to exclude onions from that
definition ....
Translated into English, this definition effectively states that everything is a
commodity, except onions. Needless to say, this inscrutable definition has given
rise to serious head scratching in certain corners of academe. For example, Professors Louis Loss of Harvard and Joel Seligman of Michigan, two otherwise
competent scholars, were stumped by the onion exemption. They expressed their
curiosity in a recently published volume of their authoritative treatise on securities law ...
In response to this uncharacteristic lapse, I undertook the task of documenting
some of the legal and economic history of the onion exemption. The enclosed
letter to Professors Loss and Seligman describes the results of that research.
Missing from that analysis is any consideration of the political factors that
caused onions to be treated differently from, say, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes). Professors Loss and Seligman would greatly appreciate any insight you
might be able to provide regarding the political history of the onion exemption .
. . . I would, of course, be glad to forward any information you might be able
to provide.
President Ford takes his mail very seriously. He soon wrote Commissioner
Grundfest:
The "onion exemption" brings back interesting recollections of my service as
the Congressman from the 5th District of Michigan. The 5th District included
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Hudsonville, Michigan, which is a very productive onion producing area of predominately farmers of Dutch heritage. As their Congressman, I responded to
their plea to exclude onions from future trading and worked hard in the Congress
to achieve successfully their viewpoint.
Unfortunately, I do not recall after these many years the details of that legislative struggle. The best and most authoritative source of information would be my
Congressional papers which are available at the Gerald R. Ford Library on the
campus of the University of Michigan.
So prompted by President Ford, the librarians of The University of Michigan Law
School quickly swung into action. Within days, they had identified 83 pages in the
Gerald R. Ford Library that might be relevant. After a brief delay - the Ford Library
refused to release the letters until it was prepaid 35 cents per page - the "Onion Papers" arrived. Most of the letters were the complaints of onion farmers, the contents of
which were effectively suggested by the observation of one in particular: "It is the manipulators that set the price, and for the last two yrs., they ran the price down so that
the grower had to sell far below cost. . .. "The National Onion Association weighed in:
"For years the Nation's onion growers have been victimized by uncontrolled fluctuations and manipulations of onion futures. The industry wants futures eliminated."
Support for this cause proved bipartisan. Not only then Congressman Ford but also
Minnesota's Democratic Governor Freeman strongly favored ending onion futures.
All the cause lacked was an effective opponent. So far as I could tell by studying the
correspondence, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, on which onion futures then were
traded, barely stirred from its slumber. Inevitably victory was secured. There is a particularly poignant concluding letter in which then Congressman Ford's administrative
assistant writes, "The huge carton of delicious looking onions arrived today and I certainly want to thank you ... for your thoughtfulness in forwarding them to me." Even
in an age of vicuna coats, I suspect no one would have begrudg~d Ford, or his administrative assistant, this unsolicited reward.'

NOTES
I. Since I am uncomfortable writing anything without a footnote, let me add the
following. Between the time this was written and the time my secretary could type
it, President Bush issued a ringing declamation to the effect, "I am president of the
United States and I am not going to eat anymore broccoli!" This statement was at first
extremely troubling to me. Why broccoli? Surely a politician as schooled in the art of
survival as George Bush would not needlessly pick a fight without some political motivation. My colleague Rick Lempert suggested the motivation was obvious. Bush is
pandering to the 6- and 7-year-old voters who he counts on for support if he succeeds
in repealing the 22nd Amendment that limits presidents to two terms. That may be the
answer, in part, but it cannot be the complete answer. My strong suspicion is that a far
higher percentage of 6- and 7-year-olds detest lima beams than detest broccoli. Indeed,
broccoli can be smothered with melted cheese so that it has virtually no independent
taste, while no right-thinking parent would so attempt to adulterate the taste of lima
beans. Clearly another part of the answer must lie in the realities of Washington politics. There is no doubt a powerful lima bean lobby, similar to the National Onion
Association I described in the text, ready to protect their vegetable from any and all
political or market threats. I am doubtful that the broccoli producers have a similar
lobby. Hence Bush probably cleverly choose both an unpopular vegetable and one with
no visible political support.
To some, this line of argument may seem like pure speculation. But surely not to
Washington insiders. They well remember the sad experience of Alfred Kahn who,
when on the White House staff, was told he could not use the term "recession" in an
address. Kahn, foolishly, thought he could poke a little political fun at others in the
White House by delivering an address substituting the word "banana" for each reference that he had earlier written to "recession." The reaction of the banana lobby almost
drive him out of Washington. In his next address, he wisely used "kumquats" as his
surrogate term, after confirming that there was no kumquat lobby.
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